Seeing-in as three-fold experience by Kurg, Regina-Nino
- - 
Regina-Nino Kurg
University of Fribourg
It is generally agreed that Edmund Husserl’s theory of depiction
describes a three-fold experience of seeing something in pictures,
whereas RichardWollheim’s theory is a two-fold experience of seeing-
in. The aim of this article is to show that Wollheim’s theory can be
interpreted as a three-fold experience of seeing-in. I will first give an
overviewofWollheimandHusserl’s theories of seeing-in, andwill then
show how the concept of figuration inWollheim’s theory is analogous
to the concept of the image subject as the depicted object in Husserl’s
theory. I will claim that our experience of non-figurative pictures is
a two-fold seeing-in, while that of figurative pictures is a three-fold
seeing-in.
1
RichardWollheim calls seeing-in a special kind of experience that
is marked by a duality called two-foldness: We see
1. the marked surface, and
2. something in the surface.1
In other words, seeing-in permits simultaneous attention to the
medium and to the object.2 To understand the difference between
1Wollheim 1998, p. 21.
2Wollheim 1980, p. 212–213.
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ordinary visual experience and pictorial experience, Wollheim intro-
duces the terms configuration and representation. A picture that de-
picts something is both a two-dimensional configuration of lines and
strokes on the picture’s surface, as well as a three-dimensional rep-
resentation. The configuration is something physical and definitely
visible. However, it is wrong to compare our visual experience of an
object with that of a picture’s configuration: “it is only when we think
of our drawing as a flat configuration that we can talk of the unalike-
ness or dissimilarity of the thingwedrawand the thingwe see.”3 Seeing
the configurationmeans to attend towhatmight be called the physical
dimension of a picture, which must be differentiated from its pictorial
dimension. For example, when black paint is put on a white canvas,
our seeing of the paint on the canvas is the physical dimension, and
our seeing how the black is on the white is the pictorial dimension.4
The latter involves awareness of depth, which is also the minimal re-
quirement for representation.
Edmund Husserl describes the experience of seeing something in
a picture in his lecture course ‘Phantasy and Image Consciousness,’
of 1904/5. According to Husserl, depictive or image consciousness in-
volves three objects:
1. the physical image [das physische Bild];
2. the image object [Bildobjekt];
3. the image subject [Bildsujet].5
Husserl gives the example of a black and white photograph represent-
ing a child. In this case, the image as a physical thing is the imprinted
paper, which is a real object taken as such in perception. The physical
thing can be torn or warped, and even destroyed. The image object or
representing/depicting object, on the other hand, “has never existed
and never will exist.”6 It is a photographic image of a child that devi-
ates from the real child in many respects. The real child, that is, the
3Wollheim 1974, p. 22.
4Ibid., pp. 26-27.
5Husserl 2005, p. 21.
6Ibid., p. 21.
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image subject, has red cheeks and blond hair, for example, but the
photographic image of the child has none of these colours. It displays
photographic colours and deviates from the real child in size.
2
Until now, minimal attention has been paid to the similarities and
differences betweenHusserl andWollheim’s theories of seeing-in. But
from the few texts that have been published, a general view emerges,
which sees Husserl’s theory as providing two levels of seeing-in: we
see the image object in the physical image, and the image subject in
the image object; whereas Wollheim’s theory deals only with the first
level of seeing-in. Göran Sonesson, for instance, thinks that Husserl’s
explanations are more precise only in explaining the seeing-in of the
image subject in the image object, but, in his view, the question of
how to see the image object in the physical image is more important,
and this is the question with which Wollheim is concerned.7 In like
manner, JohnBrough thinks that there are two senses of seeing-in, and
this is why we should speak of three-foldness instead of two-foldness
in image consciousness. That is, 1) we are aware of the surface of the
physical support; 2) we see something in it (that gives us the image);
and 3) we see the subject in the image.8 Brough adds:
Seeing-in ismore complicated thanmight initially appear.
Husserl’s remarks about imaging suggest that it is possible
to distinguish two levels of seeing-in (Husserl 2005, pp. 21;
30). Wollheim does not seem to make this distinction, in-
stead focusing exclusively on what I take to be the first of
the two levels. In this first kind of seeing-in I see some-
thing in the images physical support [ . . . ]. The second
level of seeing-in involves seeing something in the image
rather than in its physical substratum. Here the subject of
the image comes into play: I see the subject in the image.9
7Sonesson 1989, p. 272.
8Brough 2012, p. 552.
9Ibid., p. 551.
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Brough thinks that the subject we see in a picture of Cartier-
Bresson’s photograph, for instance, is Simone de Beauvoir. Thismeans
that the subject is a specific person andnot, aswemightwant to claim,
a small grey figure of awoman. Inmy view, the fact that the image sub-
ject is a specific person or a thing plays an important role in under-
standing the three-foldness of the seeing-in experience. It becomes
evidentwhenwe compareHusserl’s earlier texts from 1904/5, inwhich
he defends the three-fold theory of image consciousness with his later
texts from 1918, in which he starts to doubt whether image conscious-
ness must always occur in the mode of depiction and claims that, in
some cases, the subject as a depicted object is not involved in image
consciousness. He thinks that in a theatrical performance an actor (in
most cases) creates an image of [Bild von] a character in the play or
some tragic event but not a depiction of [Abbild von] the character or
the tragic event. In this sense, the image subject is absent.10 To quote
Husserl:
The actor’s presentation is not a presentation in the sense
in which we say of an image object that an image subject
is presented in it. Neither the actor nor the image that
is his performance for us is an image object in which an-
other object, an actual or even fictive image subject, is de-
picted.11
In Brough’s view, we have the same kind of experience when we
look at nonfigurative art: the images do not represent any particular
subject or a subject of a particular kind.12 Accordingly, abstract paint-
ing is a two-fold image consciousness.13
10In Brough’s view, this does not mean that theatrical presentations do not have subjects in a more
general sense. A theatre play is definitely about something, although not depicting any particular person
or place or event (Brough 1997, p. 44).
11Husserl 2005, p. 616.
12Brough 1997, p. 45.
13Ibid., p. 30.
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3
Now, if we agree with Brough that leaving out the image subject as
depicted object makes Husserl’s theory of image consciousness a two-
fold experience of seeing-in, thenWollheim’s distinction between the
representational content and the figurative content (that ismore than
just representational content) couldbe takenas awayof adding a third
fold to the seeing-in experience. According to Wollheim, figuration is
a specific form of representation: if we see in a marked surface things
that are three-dimensionally related, then we have representation; if
we can correctly identify those things, we have figuration.14 To quote
Wollheim:
The idea of representational content is much broader
than that of figurative content. The representational con-
tent of a painting derives fromwhat can be seen in it. The
figurative content derives fromwhat can be seen in it and
can be brought under non-abstract concepts, such as ta-
ble, map, window, woman.15
Accordingly, abstract paintings have representational content but
no figurative content. Abstract paintings are representations since the
minimal requirement of representation is that we experience depth
or “that we see in the marked surface things three-dimensionally re-
lated.”16 Very few abstract paintings lack representational content, like
Barnett Newman’s Vir Heroicus Sublimis.17 Thus, Hans Hofmann’s
Cathedral has representational content but Vermeer’s Officer and
Laughing Girl has representational and figurative content.18
14Wollheim 1998, p. 21.
15Wollheim 2001, p. 131.
16Wollheim 1998, p. 21.
17Wollheim 2001, p. 131. It has been pointed out that the requirement of depth is not always fulfilled
even in the cases of figurative pictures. For example, the stick figure drawing has no background. Paolo
Spinicci shows, however, that the requirement of apparent depth is nevertheless fulfilled, since the fig-
urative content constitutes a figurative space of its own (Spinicci 2012, p. 99).
18Wollheim 2001, p. 131.
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As an aside, wemay observe that Wollheim also thinks that repre-
sentations can be divided according to the particular or kind of object
they represent. That is, representation can either be of a particular ob-
ject or event, or it can be of an object or event that are merely of some
particular kind. For instance, a painting can represent aparticular per-
son, say Madame Moitessier in Ingre’s painting of the same name, or
it can represent awoman, like inManet’s La Prune.19Hence, it is inter-
esting to ask whether the particularity of the object depicted adds a
further, fourth level or fold to the experience of seeing-in though. This
is not a line we will pursue here.
At this point, I only want to emphasise that Wollheim’s view im-
plies two different kinds of experience: seeing non-figurative and fig-
urative pictures, where the first can be explained as two-fold and the
secondas three-fold seeing-in. In the case of thenon-figurativepicture
we experience the configuration of lines and strokes on the picture’s
surface and the representation. In the case of the figurative picture, we
also see figuration. Thus, the three folds of the seeing-in of a figurative
picture are: 1) configuration, 2) representation, and 3) figuration.
4
Now, one could argue that the “missing” third fold in Wollheim’s
theory of seeing-in is another experience that connects the experience
of seeing the picture and that of seeing something or someone in the
picture. This criticism is presented by Flint Schier:
So what we really require is (as it were) a three-fold expe-
rience: an experience as of seeing the canvas, an experi-
ence as of seeing you, and an experience as of there being
certain features of the canvas which make it ‘appropriate’
that I should be seeing you as having certain features.20
Schier thinks that Wollheim’s theory of seeing-in does not ade-
quately describe pictorial experience. He believes that Wollheim’s
19Wollheim 1998, pp. 67-68.
20Schier 1986, p. 201.
23
seeing-in as three-fold experience
double-experience model of the seeing-in only gives us two simulta-
neous experiences: an experience as of seeing the picture canvas (see-
ing S) and an experience as of seeing what is depicted on it (seeing O).
However, in Schier’s view, this does not explain how the experience of
S is related to the experience of O, for the simple coincidence of the
two experiences “cannot amount necessarily to an experience as of
their being related in a certain way.”21 In other words, what is missing
is the picture-relation: “The brute fact of a double experience of S and
of O [ . . . ] does not add up to seeing S as a picture of O.”22
In my view, there are at least two reasons to discredit Schier’s
account of Wollheim’s theory. First, Schier does not make a proper
distinction between seeing-as and seeing-in theories. Although he
refers to the second edition of Art and its Objects, in which Wollheim
makes the distinction, he is willing to admit that he does not see any
real change inWollheim’s account, instead claiming that allWollheim
does in the second edition is to make the account of seeing-as more
nuanced.23 Given this, it becomes clearer why Schier tries to find the
connection between an experience as of seeing the canvas and an ex-
perience as of seeing the (depicted) object. But in Wollheim’s words,
seeing-in ismarked by the duality of simply seeing themarked surface
and seeing something in the surface.24
Second, for Schier the main question seems to be how these sep-
arate (although simultaneous) experiences of seeing-in can be united
into one pictorial experience. He does not take the seeing-in expe-
rience to be one single experience with different aspects. But this is
not in accordancewithWollheim’s theory, especially not with his later
specifications about the two-foldness thesis. In the text “On Picto-
rial Representation,”Wollheimwrites that he originally identified two-
foldnesswith “two simultaneous perceptions: one of the pictorial sur-
face, the other of what it represents,” and says that he recently recon-
ceived the theory, now understanding it in terms of a single experience
21Schier 1986, p. 204.
22Ibid., p. 201.
23Ibid., p. 19. Moreover, Schier thinks that seeing-as is a stronger notion than seeing-in and “a better
basis for an analysis of pictorial experience” (ibid., pp. 203-204).
24Wollheim 1998, p. 21.
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with two aspects, which he calls, in this text, the configurational and
the recognitional.25
In my view, there is nothing “missing” in Wollheim’s theory of
seeing-in, and the three-foldness thesis emerges naturally from his
theory. It is coherent with Wollheim’s theory to claim that the three
folds of the single experience of seeing-in are configuration, represen-
tation, and figuration.
5
In this paper I have not tried to claim that Wollheim’s theory is
identical to Husserl’s theory of seeing-in. Their theories differenti-
ate in many respects. For example, in Wollheim’s view representa-
tion requires the awareness of depth but, as Brough has shown, see-
ing depth is not a necessary condition for having an image, according
to Husserl.26 In addition, Wollheimwould not say that we see a photo-
graphic image of a child inminiature in a black andwhite photograph.
Instead, he would say that we see the real child. I have tried to show
that there is a similarity between Wollheim and Husserl’s theory in
the sense in which they differentiate the experience of figurative and
non-figurative pictures. Our experience of seeing-in a picture depends
upon whether the picture has the figurative content: only in the case
of figurative picture is seeing-in a three-fold experience.
reginanino@yahoo.com
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